What Are Shared Emotions (for)? by John Michael
OPINION
published: 24 March 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00412
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 412
Edited by:
Joel Krueger,
University of Exeter, UK
Reviewed by:
Elena Clare Cuffari,
Worcester State University, USA
Zuzanna Rucinska,
University of Hertfordshire, UK
*Correspondence:
John Michael
michaelj@ceu.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 25 December 2015
Accepted: 08 March 2016
Published: 24 March 2016
Citation:
Michael J (2016) What Are Shared
Emotions (for)? Front. Psychol. 7:412.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00412
What Are Shared Emotions (for)?
John Michael *
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Keywords: shared emotions, minimalism, joint action, development, phenomenology, coordination, cooperation
In recent years, a burgeoning literature has been developing around the topic of shared emotions,
addressing such questions as whether there is any such thing as a shared emotion, and what
functions shared emotions may have. A quick survey of that literature reveals that different
researchers have proposed to conceptualize shared emotions in different ways—and that at least
some participants to the debate take these different proposals to be incompatible.
In this brief discussion, I will be arguing that these different proposals are in fact not
incompatible, and that they only appear to be incompatible if one assumes that there is just one
natural kind for which the term “shared emotion” should be reserved. In the absence of any
compelling argument in favor of adopting this assumption, I suggest that it should be dropped,
and that we should acknowledge that the term “shared emotion” refers to a motley of overlapping
phenomena that do not make up a single natural kind. In view of this, the most productive
way forward is for researchers to be as clear as possible about what they are trying to explain
in proposing a particular conception of shared emotions. To begin with, consider four different
conceptions that have recently been proposed.
The first is one that I myself presented with the aim of demarcating a range of phenomena
that are systematically related to each other and that can function as coordinating factors in joint
actions, and to specify the conditions under which they can so function (Michael, 2011). To this
end, I proposed the following minimal criteria. For two individuals, X and Y, there is a shared
emotion when:
(a) X expresses her affective state (verbally or otherwise); and
(b) Y perceives this expression;
In view of the aim of specifying the conditions under which shared emotions can function as
coordinating factors in joint actions, I also proposed to limit discussion to shared emotions that
also fulfill a third criterion, namely that:
(c) Y’s perception of X’s expression leads to effects that function as coordinating factors within an
interaction between x and Y.
Shared emotions in this sense can facilitate coordination by facilitating the exchange of information
between X and Y about how X evaluates the current situation. For example, X’s expression of
frustration may indicate that she needs additional support or that the plan is not working and
needs to be revised.
Now consider a second conception of shared emotions, which at first glance appears quite
different from the minimal account. Salmela and Nagatsu (2016), propose that X and Y have a
shared emotion when X and Y:
(d) have emotions of the same type with similar intentional structure and affective experience; and
(e) are mutually aware of this.
Salmela and Nagatsu, like myself, are guided by the aim of explaining how shared emotions can
serve particular functions within joint actions. They wind up with a different set of criteria because
the particular functions they are interested in are different. Specifically, they are interested in how
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shared emotions can generate social cohesion, trigger team
reasoning and stabilize cooperation. Thus, the differences
between the two accounts can be traced back to their related
but distinct explanatory aims: Salmela and Nagatsu’s account is
designed to explain how shared emotions support individuals’
motivation to engage in joint action and to contribute to each
other’s goals and shared goals, whereas mine wasmainly designed
to show how shared emotions support individuals’ ability to
coordinate.
A third conception of shared emotions can be found in
Krueger (2013; cf. also Krueger, 2014). Krueger argues that the
concept of shared emotions is a useful tool for explaining how
infants come to experience some emotions. Specifically, he points
out that emotional experience places demands upon endogenous
attention and affective regulation that exceed the capacities of
infants, and that caregivers scaffold infants’ emotional experience
by fulfilling these functions for (and together with) children in
dyadic interactions. Insofar as these endogenous attention and
affective regulation are typically part of an emotional episode,
parity of reasoning demands that the contributions of caregivers
to these emotional episodes should also be considered part of
the emotional episodes (for criticism, see Bohl and Mölder,
2015). Plainly, Krueger’s conception of shared emotions is quite
different from the previous two: rather than stipulating any
particular criteria for shared emotions, he argues that the criteria
for emotional episodes in general sometimes are fulfilled by dyads
rather than individuals.
Finally, Zahavi and Rochat (2015) propose a conception
of shared emotions which differs markedly from both of the
preceding proposals. On their view, shared emotions do not
require x and y to have emotions of the same type [i.e.,
they reject conditions (d) and (e)]. Instead, they propose that
“emotional sharing involves experiences that the subjects can
only have in virtue of their reciprocal relation to each other,
experiences that rather than being independent of each other
are constitutively interdependent. Shared emotional sharing is
consequently something over and above empathy1. It adds
reciprocity and co-regulation to the understanding that is
provided by empathy” (Zahavi and Rochat, 2015, p.7).
It is apparent that the conception offered by Zahavi and
Rochat differs from the other three conceptions. Indeed,
Zahavi and Rochat appear to believe that their conception
is incompatible with at least two of the aforementioned
1For the sake of clarity, it is worth pointing out that, in referring to empathy,
Zahavi and Rochat have in mind the traditional phenomenological concept of
empathy, where empathy “rather than being identified with, say, prosocial behavior
or a very special kind of imaginative perspective taking, is simply used as a label for
our most basic other-acquaintance, i.e., our sensitivity to and direct experience of
otherminded creatures” (Zahavi and Rochat, 2015, p.15). In other words, empathy,
as they understand it, does not require an empathizer to experience a same emotion
of the same type as the person with whom she is empathizing, and indeed it
does not require either person to experience any emotion at all. “rather than
being identified with, say, prosocial behavior or a very special kind of imaginative
perspective taking, is simply used as a label for our most basic other-acquaintance,
i.e., our sensitivity to and direct experience of other minded creatures” (Zahavi
and Rochat, 2015, p.15). In other words, empathy, as they understand it, does not
require an empathizer to experience a same emotion of the same type as the person
with whom she is empathizing, and indeed it does not require either person to
experience any emotion at all.
conceptions: contra Salmela and Nagatsu2, they maintain that
sharing, “cannot simply be equated with similarity,” (p.6) They
go on: “Nor is it plausible to argue, as Michael has done in a
recent article, that emotion detection amounts to a minimal form
of sharing and that a paradigmatic way of sharing an emotion
is for X to express an affective state, and for Y to perceive that
expression...To claim that I am (aware of) sharing one of your
emotions, while denying that you are (aware of) sharing one of
mine, does not seem to make that much sense.”
Although Zahavi and Rochat do not explicitly state why they
dismiss these other views, they appear to be reasoning that there
is a particular type of experience which their conception captures
and which the other conceptions do not capture. If so, then
there is a problem: Zahavi and Rochat need to indicate what
basis they have for asserting that the expression “shared emotion”
should be reserved for this type of experience. In the absence
of any reason for adopting the assumption that shared emotions
constitute a natural kind, it is open to proponents of alternative
conceptions to acknowledge happily that Zahavi and Rochat
provide an analysis of their target phenomenon, but to reply that
they are interested in some other explananda.
In view of the diversity of conceptions of shared emotions that
are available in the current literature, it is justified to conclude
that the expression “shared emotion” is in fact used to refer to
a motley of phenomena that do not make up a single natural
kind. This is not a problem: different conceptions of shared
emotions are suited to different explanatory purposes, and should
accordingly be tailored to those explanatory purposes. In the
interest of constructive debate, then, it would be highly desirable
for researchers to be as clear as possible about what they are
trying to explain in proposing a particular conception of sharing
emotions.
This does not mean that the different explanatory targets, or
the different conceptions of shared emotions that are tailored
to those targets, are likely to have nothing at all to do with
each other. Indeed, at least some of them may relate to each
in systematic ways. In fact, one way of thinking about the
relationship betweenmy own account and that offered by Salmela
and Nagatsu is that both accounts start out from criteria (a)
and (b)3 and then add different further criteria according to
their different explanatory aims. If this is correct, then it shows
how a minimal framework like the one presented in Michael
(2011) may provide a useful tool for relating at least some of
these different accounts. This is because a minimal framework
starts out from as few controversial assumptions or criteria as
possible. Depending on what one wants to explain, one may add
assumptions and criteria accordingly4. This is also a productive
research strategy since it makes it possible to identify what
additional conditions are required in order to explain what
specific phenomena.
2NB: They are not specifically discussing Salmela and Nagatsu’s proposal here.
3Salmela and Nagatsu do not explicitly endorse these criteria, but, as far as I can
tell, the fulfillment of these criteria is likely to be the most basic and most common
way in which criterion (e) is fulfilled.
4This is also the logic underlying minimal approaches in other areas, such as the
minimal approach to joint action offered in Vesper et al. (2010) and the minimal
approach to the sense of commitment offered in Michael et al. (2016).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 412
Michael What are Shared Emotions (for)?
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and
approved it for publication.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
JM was supported by a Marie Curie Intra European Fellowship
(PIEF-GA-2012-331140).
REFERENCES
Bohl, V., andMölder, B. (2015). “How (not) to Analyze Shared Emotions,” in Poster
Presentation at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the European Society for Philosophy
and Psychology (Tartu).
Krueger, J. (2013). Merleau-Ponty on shared emotions and the joint
ownership thesis. Cont. Philos. Rev. 46, 509–553. doi: 10.1007/s11007-013-
9278-5
Krueger, J. (2014). Varieties of extended emotions. Phenom. Cogn. Sci. 13, 533–555.
doi: 10.1007/s11097-014-9363-1
Michael, J. (2011). Shared emotions and joint action. Rev. Philos. Psychol. 2,
355–373. doi: 10.1007/s13164-011-0055-2
Michael, J., Sebanz, N., and Knoblich, G. (2016). The sense of commitment: a
minimal approach. Front. Psychol. 6:1968. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01968
Salmela, M., and Nagatsu, M. (2016). Collective emotions and joint action: beyond
received and minimalist approaches. J. Soc. Ontol. doi: 10.1515/jso-2015-0020.
[Epub ahead of print].
Vesper, C., Butterfill, S., Knoblich, G., and Sebanz, N. (2010). A
minimal architecture for joint action. Neural Netw. 23, 998–1003. doi:
10.1016/j.neunet.2010.06.002
Zahavi, D., and Rochat, P. (2015). Empathy 6= sharing: Perspectives from
phenomenology and developmental psychology. Conscious. Cogn. 36, 543–553.
doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2015.05.008
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Michael. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or
reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor
are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance
with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted
which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 March 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 412
